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1. Peter Klein’s work on the epistemic regress problem, infinitism, and the desiderata 
of avoiding circularity and arbitrariness is very fascinating, and fully deserves the 
ample attention it is given in the literature. 
 
2. Foundationalism can avoid circularity and objective arbitrariness, but not subjective 
arbitrariness (Chapter 5). 
 
3. Coherentism seems able to avoid circularity, but can succeed only if it allows 
subjective arbitrariness (Chapter 6). 
 
4. None of the existing versions of infinitism, not even Klein’s version, avoids 
subjective arbitrariness (Chapter 7). 
 
5. If human beings cannot (or do not) hold infinitely many beliefs of ever-increasing 
complexity, then either they hold arbitrary beliefs or they hold beliefs on the basis of 
circular chains (or both) (Chapter 7). 
 
6. Debates about foundationalism would benefit if contributors were first to reach 
agreement on what basic beliefs do not need for their justification. 
 
7. It would be good if philosophers discussing the basing relation, or any other (causal) 
concept, were prohibited to use the adverb ‘suitably’. 
 
8. The fact that James Pryor’s paper ‘The Skeptic and the Dogmatist’, published in 
Noûs in 2000, has become a much discussed and very often cited ‘classic’ in 
mainstream epistemology, while a position nearly identical to the one defended by 
Pryor had already been developed 26 years earlier by John Pollock in his book 
Knowledge and Justification from 1974 (Ch. 2, Sect. 3.4), in the same style and with 
a very similar motivation, may well give rise to oppressive feelings. 
 
9. Good philosophy requires mental self-castigation. 
